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[CHAPTER 1] 
Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900) 
COMMENTARY 
PAUL VALLIERE 
The systematic study of law, one of the central concerns of Western Chris­
tian civilization since the Middle Ages, has not enjoyed comparable central­
ity in the Christian East. The Byzantine legal tradition, described in the 
preceding introduction, perished with the fall of the Byzantine Empire 
(1453). Since then, the catalyst for the development of legal thought in the 
Orthodox East has been contact with the West. The dynamic, often aggres­
sive, projection of Western influence into the Orthodox world in modern 
times forced Eastern Christians to take an interest in Western civilization 
whether they wished to or not. Among the many subjects demanding atten­
tion, Western legalism-civil, politica 1, and ecclesiastical-was particularly 
difficult for Orthodox people to appreciate because of the absence of analo­
gous structures in their own living tradition. 
Orthodox reflection on modern legalism began in Russia, not because the 
Russians were better prepared to think about law than the other Orthodox 
peoples, but because Russia was the first Orthodox country to attempt to re­
make itself into a state and society of the modern type. The reforms of Peter 
the Great and Catherine the Great in the eighteenth century stimulated pro­
found reflection on the foundations of civil society. During the "Moscow 
Spring" of 1809-12, the statesman and jurist Mikhail Speransky-the son of 
an Orthodox village priest-convinced Tsar Alexander I to contemplate an 
extensive reform of the Russian Empire along legal lines. Napoleon's invasion 
in 1812 put an end to this project, but Russian legal science conti nued to de­
velop. Speransky devoted the second half of his career to preparing the first 
systematic code of law in the history of Russia. ll)e first edition of this mas­
sive work was published in 1832. Later in the century Timofei Granovsky 
(1813-55) and Boris Chicherin (1828-1903) laid the foundations of Russian 
34 ~ VladJlnJr Solovlev (1853-1900) 
legal philosophy. As part of the Great Reforms of the 1860s, a new judicial 
system was set up, jury trial was introduced, and a Russian bar was created. 
The rule of law appeared to have begun in Russia. 
What had not begun was the reconciliation of the fledgling Russian legal 
tradition with the Orthodox Christian tradition, which commanded the re­
ligious loya It)' of the large majority of the population of the Russian Empire. 
Aleksei Khomiakoy (1804-60), Ivan Kireevsk)' (1806-56), and the other 
early Slavophiles who created modern Russian Orthodox religious philoso­
phy viewed legal rationality as the quintessential manifestation of cold­
hearted, ultimately atheistic Western rationalism. Against it they preached 
an Orthodox Christian ethic of love and community. Later in the century 
the novelist Leo Tolstoy propounded a similar view along humanist rather 
than Orthodox lines. Unfortunately, Orthodox hierarchs and church theo­
logians had little to sayan the subject. The close, not to say confining, bonds 
that tied the Orthodox Church to the imperial state meant that church 
leaders had much less freedom to address the issues of the day than lay 
theologians. Many Russians were thus left with the impression that they 
had to choose between the Orthodox moral and spiritual tradition on one 
hand and modern legalism on the other, between Christian love and human 
rights. 1he most brilliant Orthodox jurists, such as Speransky, certainly did 
not view the case in such stark terms. But they were specialists. They did not 
deal directly with the reI igious and theologicaI impl ications of thei r subject. 
The breakthrough came with Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900). Soloviev 
was the first modern Orthodox thinker who both regarded law in a posi­
tive light and set out to relate it to the grand themes of Orthodox. theol­
ogy. He applied himself to the project in a variety of venues for more than 
twenty years, assigning it a central place in his magnum opus, The Justifi­
cation of the Good (1897). No other modern Orthodox thinker has yet 
matched his contribution to the discussion of law, society, and human na­
ture from an Orthodox perspective. 
SOLOYIEY'S LIFE AND WORK 
Vlad imir Sergeevich Solov iev was born in Moscow in 1853 to a prom inent 
academic family.1 His father, Sergei Mikhailovich, descended from a long 
line of Orthodox priests, and was a professor of history at Moscow Uni­
versity. His mother, Poliksena Vladimirovna, came from a military family 
of Polish and Ukrainian extraction, 
Vladimir matriculated at Moscow University in 1869 after receiving an 
excellent classical education. Somewhat unexpectedly, he chose to study 
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the natural sciences, although he eventually completed his degree in the 
faculty of history and philology. Soloviev's false start in the sciences is 
someti mes attributed to a youthful passion for philosoph iea I materialism, 
the doctrine of choice for young intellectuals in Russia in the 1860s. But 
one should reckon also with a young man's need to put some distance be­
tween himself and his famous father. Sergei Soloviev (1820-79) was the 
most prominent Russian historian of his generation. His massive History 
ofRussia/rom Ancient Times remains one of the most impressive manu· 
ments of Russian intellectual culture.2 When Vladimir matriculated at 
Moscow University, Sergei was dean of the faculty of history and philol­
ogy. In 1871 he became rector of the university. 
Vladimir discovered where his genius lay thanks to the mentoring of 
Pamfil Danilovich Yurkevich (1827-74), a professor of philosophy. Yurke\'­
ich had been at Moscow University since 1861, but his roots lay in the Or­
thodox theological schools where he trained and taught for many years. 
Yurkevich is remembered for seminal essays in philosophical anthropol­
ogy in which he criticized modern materialist conceptions of human na­
ture from a biblical perspective emphasizing the wholeness and moral 
consciousness of human beings-what the Bible calls the "heart."3 
After graduation in 1873 Soloviev elected to spend a postgraduate year 
at Moscow Theological Academy, one of four graduate schools of theology 
operated by the Russian Orthodox Church. This was an unusual step for an 
aspiring academic to take at the time and attests to Soloviev's unconven­
tional personality as well as to his religious interests. In 1874 Soloyiev re­
turned to the university to defend his master's thesis and first book, The 
Crisis of Western Philosophy. The following year he began teaching at his 
alma mater but soon departed for a yea r's study in London. There he did re­
search on mysticism and gnosticism in the British Museum and mixed 
with the local spiritualist community. The spiritualists left him cold, but in 
the museum he had a mystical vision of Divine Wisdom (Sophia). Sophia 
directed him to travel to Egypt, promising to reveal herself again there­
which she did, although not until Soloviev nearly lost his life at the hands 
of hostile Bedouin on a walk in the desert near the pyramids. 
In 1876 Soloviev resumed teaching at Moscow University only to re­
sign before the end of the academic year and move to St. Petersburg, It 
was becoming obvious that Soloviev was a man who disliked established 
paths. Restless, impulsive, visionary, he gravitated to a peripatetic life­
style. He would have made a fine bohemian were it not for his extraordi­
nary work ethic. He finished his second book, The Philosophical Principles 
ofIntegral Knowledge in 1877, began Lectures on Divine Humanity in the 
same year, and defended his doctoral dissertation, which became The 
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Critique ofAbstract Principles, in 1880. The author of four books in six 
years was twenty-seven years old.~ 
SOLOVlfV'S SLAVOPHILlSM 
In Petersburg Soloviev lectured in both academic and popular venues, 
presenting himself as a young Slavophile. Slavophilism and its antagonist, 
Western ism, were vehicles of the culture wars of ni neteenth-celltury Rus­
sia, the centurr-Iong debate over Russia's destiny in the modern world. 
The debate concerned the features of Russian civilization that distin­
guished it from the West: Orthodox Christianity, political autocracy, and 
a tradition of communalism in economic and social life. The Westernizers 
believed that Russia should set aside its traditional va lue system and inte­
grate itself into modern European civilization. The Slavophiles affirmed 
Russian distinctiveness. Differences of opinion existed within as well as 
between the two points of view. In Westernism there was a split between 
evolutionists and revolutionists. In Slavophilism, the affirmation of Rus­
sian particularity at times inspired isolationism (Russia should keep away 
from the West), at other times militancy (Russia has a mission to the 
West). Soloviev was a missionary Slavophile, believing that Russia had a 
message the world needed to hear. 
The message was the advent of a new, modern cultural synthesis com­
bining the best values of the European Enlightenment with the deepest 
truths of Christianity. The idea had been advanced in Russia in the previ­
ous generation by Ivan Kireevsky, who in turn was indebted to German 
Rama nticism, especially the philosophy of Schelling.s Kireevsky had stud­
ied in Berlin and Munich and carefully followed developments in Euro­
pean philosophy. Thanks to his Orthodox wife and the proximity of his 
estate to Optina Hermitage, he also paid close attention to the revival of 
monastic spiritualit yin Russia. H is hope, stated in an essay "On the Possi· 
bility and Necessity of New Principles in Philosophy" (1854), was that "Or­
thodox enlightenment should master the whole intellectual development 
of the contemporary world, so that, having enriched itself with secular 
wisdom, Christian truth may the more fully and solemnly demonstrate its 
prevalence over the relative truths of human reason:'6 
Kireevsky's quest for wholeness of life through the synthesis of reason 
with religion was Soloviev's point ofdeparture. [n The Crisis afWestern Phi­
losophy (Against the Positivists) he argued that the analytic and materialistic 
approaches to philosophy were spiritual dead-ends showing the need for 
new principles in philosophr In The Philosophical Principles of Integral 
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Knowledge he stated the case for wholeness in more positive terms. In The 
Critique of Abstract Principles he masterfully recapitulated both his cri· 
tique of Western philosophy and the case for wholeness, lending a militant 
spirit to his program by calling for its realization in a "free theocracy." 
]n Lectures on Divine Humanity Soloviev focused on the theological 
substance of his vision, what he called bogochelovcchestvo. The term is 
translated into English as Godmanhood, divine huma nity or humanity of 
God. The concept is a thematization of the Orthodox Christian doctrine 
of the incarnation. For Orthodox theology, God's becoming-human ac­
complishes not just the moral transformation of humanity (Christ "for" 
us) but also an ontological transformation (Christ "in" us), ll)anks to 
God's assumption of human nature, human nature can be raised from 
glory to glory to the point of assimilation to divine nature, or theosis (dei­
fication). Theosis is an eschatological state, but the process is already un­
derway and ca n be seen in the radiant lives of the sa ints. Soloviev gave th is 
conceptuality a historical-prophetic application: the divine-human union 
in the incarnation points the way to the cultural synthesis of the future by 
offering the world a better moral and spiritual ideal than the "godless hu­
man individual ~ of modern Western civilization or the "inhuman God" of 
Islam. Orthodox Russia, poised between West and East. has the providen­
tial mission of proclaiming the good news of "divine humanity.'" 
One of the Petersburg intellectuals to whom Soloviev's prophet ism ap­
pealed was the novelist Feodor Dostoevsky (1821-81). Although Dostoevsky 
was much older than Soloviev, the two men became friends, as evidenced 
by the fact that Dostoevsky invited Soloviev to accompany him on his pil­
grimage to Optina Hermitage in 1878 following the death of the novelist's 
three year-old son Alyosha.s The excursion occupies a special place in Rus­
sian literary history because the community at Optina was the model for 
Dostoevsky's portrait of Russian monasticism in The Brothers Karamazov 
(1878-80). Not surprisingly, critics have looked for Soloviev's portrait as 
well, and indeed The Brothers Karamazov portrays a brilliant young phi­
losopher in Ivan Karamazov. 
While it would be a mistake to equate Soloviev and [van Karamazov­
Soloviev's optimistic, belieVing personality bears no resemblance to Ivan's 
tortured soul-there is definitely a link between the two on the level of 
ideas. During the Karamazov famlly's visit to the monastery, Ivan becomes 
involved in a conversation about the scope of the jurisdiction of ecclesiasti­
cal Courts, a subject on which he has published a controversial article. 
Ivan's thesis is that the modern secular state, because it has severed its con­
nection with the church. cannot deal with crime and punishment in spiri­
tual terms and so administers justice in a mechanical and utilitarian 
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manner. Incapable of fostering repentance and amendment of life, the state 
can only repress the criminal. The criminal reacts by construing his rela­
tionship to society in equally utilitarian terms, at times even regarding his 
crime as a justifiable act of rebellion against an oppressive social order. If 
Russia is to avoid this outcome, Ivan argues, the state must reaffirm and 
expand the role of the church in society and in the legal system in particu­
lar. "Ultramontanism!" exclaims Mr. Miusov, a Westernizer horrified by 
the theocratic implications of Ivan's logic. But the monks are stirred to en­
thusiasm: "It will be! It will be!"~ As we shall see, in The Critique ofAbstract 
Principles Soloviev advocated an ideal much like Ivan's, envisioning a the­
ocracy of love inspired and sa nctified by the church. 
The reference to ultramontanism interjects a comparison between Or­
thodoxy and Roman Catholicism. The comparison is taken further by one 
of the monks, Father Paisy, who criticizes Roman Catholicism for making 
the church into a kind of state, whereas Orthodoxy envisions the transfor­
mation of the state by the spirit of the church. The indictment of Roman Ca­
tholicism for juridicalizing the gospel is also a theme in the most famous 
chapter of The Brothers Karamazov, ~The Grand Inquisitor." Soloviev re­
peated the charge in his Lectures on Divine Humanity.lO The contrast be­
tween the supposedly harsh, legalistic Western church and the loving, 
all-embracing Eastern church was a cherished stereotype in Slavophilism. 
UNIVERSALISM AND ECUM£NISM 
Soloviev's theocrat ism underwent a significant change in the 1880s. The 
decade began with a crisis. On March 1, 1881, Tsar Alexander II was assas­
sinated in Petersburg by populist revolutionaries. As Russians reeled in 
horror and confusion, Soloviev delivered a public lecture in which he 
called on the new tsar, Alexander II I. to deal with his father's assassin s 
in the spirit ofChristian love by refusing to condemn them to death. The 
revolutionaries had acted as death-dealers, but a Christian monarch should 
not. Unfortunately for Soloviev, the tsar and his government were not im­
pressed by this interpretation of theocracy and forced the young philoso­
pher to resign from the university. The incident was important because it 
caused Soloviev to reassess his understanding of theocracy. He did not 
question the ideal, but he began to question some of the forms in which he 
had been preaching it, especially the facile association of Orthodox Chris­
tianity with the Russian way of life. He also began saying positive things 
about Western civiliz.ation, including Roman Catholicism. His Slavophile 
friends soon closed their journals to him. 
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50loviev pressed his case for a more cosmopolitan understanding of 
theocracy by taking a critical look at how the Russian Orthodox commu­
nity related to its non-Russian and non-Orthodox neighbors inside and 
outside the Russian Empire. In The National Question in Russia, a collec­
tion of essays written between 1883 and 1891, Soloviev criticized Russian 
national egoism and the oppression of ethn ic and religious minorities.\1 
He also stepped forward as a strong advocate of religious liberty, which in 
1889 he called "the good which (Russia] needs first of all."\2In "The Devel­
opment of Dogma and the Question ofChurch Union" (1886) he examined 
Orthodoxy's relations with the Roman Catholic Church, arguing that 
there were no insuperable obstacles to reunion. The essay makes a pas­
sionate case for what would eventually be called ecumenism. 
The ecumenical cause occupied much of Soloviev's time in the later 
1880s. In 1886 he spent three months in Zagreb, Croatia, for discussions 
with two other nineteenth-century prophets or the idea, Bishop Josip Juraj 
Strossmayer of Bosnia and Canon Franko Racki of the South Slav Acad­
emy. In 1888 he lived most of the year in France in dialogue with Catholics 
and other Christians and arranged for the publication of La Russie et 
l'£glise universelle (1889). llHough Bishop Strossmayer, Soloviev's vision of 
a reunited Christendom was shared with Pope Leo XIII. "Bella idea," the 
pontiff reportedly replied, "ma fuor d'un rniracolo ecosa impossibile"-a 
good idea, but without a miracle it's impossible.13 
THE JEWS AN)) THE "CHRISTIAN QUESTION" 
A new relationship between Christians and Jews also figured in Soloviev's 
theocratic program. Here the issue went beyond minority rights. To 5010­
viev, the Jews were exactly who they claimed to be: the chosen people, the 
theocratic people par excellence, "the axis of universal history."14 He re­
garded the Hebrew Bible, with its detailed account of the collaboration 
of prophets, priests, and kings in the history of Israel, as the constitution 
of theocracy. When he designed The History and Future of Theocracy, a 
three-volume study of the theocratic idea in human history, he assigned 
the first volume to ancient Israel. ls To enhance his competence in the sub­
ject mat ter he stud ied Hebrew with the help of Fa ivelB. Gets, a Jewi sh in­
teIectua who became one of his closest friends. Gets also introduced 
Soloviev to the study of rabbinic texts. 
So~oviev reflected on the meaning of Judaism in several essays incJud· 
iog "The Jews and the Christian Question" (1884) and "The Talmud and 
R.ecent POlemics in Austria and Germany" (1886).16 The point of"1he Jews 
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and the Christian Question" is adumbrated in the title. Breaking with the 
nearly universal assumption by nineteenth-century Christians that there 
was a Jewish Question in Europe, Soloviev argued that the so-called Jew­
ish Question was in fact a Christian Question, that is to say, a question 
about how Christians treat the Jews: 
lhe Jews have always and everywhere regarded Christianity and behaved to­
wards it in accordance with the precepts of their religion, in conformity with 
their faith and their law. The Jews have always treated us in the Jewish way; 
we ChristIans. on the contrary, have not learned to this day to adopt a Chris­
tian attitude to the Jews. They have never transgressed their religious law in 
relfltion to us; we. on the other hand. have always broken the command­
ments of the Christian reI igion in relation to them.P 
What SoJoviev meant is that the Jews, whose Jaw constitutes them as a 
people set apart by a special religio-historical vocation, have obeyed their 
law by preserving their identity apart from Christianity; while Christians, 
whose Lord calls them to an ethic of universal love, have repeatedly vio­
lated this ethic in their relations with Jews. Since the group in need of re­
pentance and change of life is the Christians, not the Jews, one should 
speak of a Christian Question rather than a Jewish Question. 
10 his essay on the Talmud, Soloviev promoted a positive attitude toward 
Jewish law against anti-Semitic denigration of it. He pointed out that, while 
Christians tend to make a sharp distinction between Christianity and Juda­
ism, most Christians have never even read, much less studied, the Jewish 
law. If they did so. they would discover that Jewish and Christian ethical 
teachings are basically the same. What Christianity has to offer is not a new 
ethic but the redemptive humanity of God in Christ. This is a truth that the 
Jews need to receive. but they should not be expected to receive it until 
Christians do a better job of showing how Christian doctrine can transform 
life. The enduring paganism of supposedly Christian societies and the sec­
tarian divisions in the church itself present a sorry spectacle to law-abiding 
Jews. "As we see it," Soloviev imagined Jews saying to Christians, "truth 
cannot be abstract. it cannot be separated from practice. We are a people of 
law, and truth itself for us is not so much an intellectual idea as it is a law of 
l~fe. ... Your religious ideal expresses absolute holiness. but the law of your 
life remains the law of sin and injustice."\8 
Soloviev recognized that Christianity and Judaism have different his­
torical vocations, but he did not regard this as justifying Christian hostil­
ity toward the Jews. Judaism and Christianity are still in process, and both 
are destined for consummation in the same kingdom of God. Penult i­
I 
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rnate]y, there is much that the two communities can do together. In "The 
Jews and the Christian Question," Soloviev envisioned a three-way collab· 
oration between the Russian Orthodox, Polish Catholic, and Jewish com­
munities of the Russian Empi re as a way of realizing the theocratic ideal in 
Russia and showing the rest ofEurope what the right relationship between 
prophet, priest, and king in a modern state might look like. The signifi­
cance of the scheme stands out when one compares it with the Slavophile 
vision: Soloviev's theocracy had become a project for all Europe, a II Chris­
tendom, all communities of biblical faith. 
THE UNION OF OrpOSlTES 
The synthesis of Christian-theocratic and liberal-universalist values that 
Soloviev achieved in the 1880s set him apart from most of his contempo­
raries. The remaking of a Romantic Christian as a liberal universalist was 
not unknown in nineteenth-century spiritual culture, but the conversion 
usually involved the abandonment of dogmatic and theocratic beliefs for a 
more secularized faith. Soloviev, by contrast, was able to hold the entire 
spectrum of values together in a highly original synthesis, the union of 
opposites forcing him to push at the limits of ordinary language to name 
his vision. It was theo-philosophical, free-theocratic, mystical-historical. 
The term preferred by Soloviev was bogochelovecheskii, "divine-human," 
from bogochelovechestvo, Godmallhood, divine humanity, humanity of 
God. For all its difficulties in translation, this term is the most appropriate 
because it refers to the source of Soloviev's intellectual confidence-the 
incarnation. Soloviev preached a transcendent both/and. As he saw it, 
people do not have to choose between Orthodoxy and modern ity. religion 
and science, tradition and change, Christian faith and religious universal· 
ism, gospel and law, not even between God and the world. Why are these 
false choices? How is such wholeness of life available to us? Because "the 
Word became flesh and lived among us, full of grace and truth, and we 
have seen his glory" (John 1:14). In Christ the humanity of God, all things 
in heaven and on earth are reconciled and destined for incorporation in 
the kingdom of God. Inspired by this faith, Soloviev pursued his vocation: 
to advance the work of reconciliation on earth and, if need be, to stOrm 
the heavens, to wrest saints, seers, mystics, even gnostics from their ethe­
real mansions and enlist them in the sacred cause. l9 
In the 1890S Soloviev pulled back from the activism of the previous de­
cade to allow more time for writing projects in academic philosophy. His 
shift is often interpreted as evidence of disillusion with theocracy, but a 
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positive fac tor was involved as weII. In 1889 Ni kola i Grot, professor of ph i­
losophy at Moscow University and president of the Moscow Psychologica I 
Society, founded Russia's first professional philosophical journal, Ques­
tions ojPhilosophy and Psychology. Soloviev was one of the origi nal collab­
orators in this enterprise, which called him back to his primary vocation. 
During the 1890S he produced brilliant philosophical essays and mono­
graphs including Thelustification oJthe Good (1897). This large work, which 
among other things contains Soloviev's mature philosophy of law, remains 
the most magisterial work of moral philosophy in the Russian tradition. 
In 1899-1900 Soloviev composed his final work. Three Dialogues 011 War, 
Progress and the End oj World HistOIY, with a BrieJ Tale oJthe Anti-Christ. 
The last section is a litera ry apoca Iypse featuring a fight to the finish between 
the armies of an urbane, humanitarian Antichrist and a faithful remnant of 
ecumenical Christians and unassimilated Jews. The subject matter and 
proximity of the work to Soloviev's death- he died on July 31, 190o-have 
led many interpreters to suppose that Soloviev rejected activist-humanist 
Christianity at the end of his life and embraced radical apocalypticism. Re­
cently, however, Judith Deutsch Kornblatt and others have shown that this 
view is open to serious question. It will not be adopted here.2u 
LAW AND THE THEOCRACY OF LOVE 
Soloviev's first essay in the philosoph)' of law is embedded in the master­
piece of his early career, The Critique ojAbstract Principles (chaps. 15-20). 
The social ideal advanced in ""fl1e Critique is a symphonic wholeness in 
which "all constitute the end of each, and each the end of all."2J As soon as 
the project of realizing til is ki ngdo m of ends begi n5, however, the partialit y 
of human beings undermines the task. Even when they embrace the ideal of 
all for each and each for all, human beings find it difficult to do justice to 
both sides at once. Those who lean to "each" generate individualism; those 
who favor "all" generate some form of collectivism; and so the common 
project of building the good society is undermined. Instead of addressing 
IiVl ng hu ma n bei ngs in the actual world, ethicists dea Iwith "the ind ividua1" 
and "societ y." But these are abstractions. rn actua lit}' no absolute individual 
exists; ifhe did, he would be a case of "empty personhood."22 Conversely, no 
society exists except as composed of living individuals. 
Soloviev's critique of abstractions was connected with his understand­
ing of moral evil, or sin. As he saw it, the root of moral evil in huma nity is 
the tendency to "exclusivity," that is to say, the temptation to substitute the 
part for the whole, to affirm oneself or one's dependents in isolation from 
the all-encompassing whole of things. "This abnormal attitude toward 
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everything else-this exclusive self-assertion, or egoism, all-powerful in 
our practical life even though we deny it in theory, this opposition of the 
self to all other selves and the practical negation of other selves-constitutes 
the radical evil of our nature.un 
The evil of exclusivity is overcome through renunciation. Renunciation 
does not mean self-annihilation, which is actua lIy another sort of exclu­
sivity, but the overcoming of partiality. The paradigm is given in Jesus, the 
incarnate Word who accomplishes ~the double exploit of divine and hu­
man self-renunciation." Though very God, the Word lays aside his divine 
glory to become a human being; and as a human being Jesus does his fa­
ther's will. not his own. The moral grandeur of the accomplishment is 
seen at the very beginning of]esus' ministry in the temptation in the wil­
derness. Three times the prince of darkness invites the Messiah to self-as­
sertion. but UChrist subordinates His human will to, and harmonizes it 
with, the divine will, deifying His humanity after the humanization ofJ-lis 
Divinity."24 Dostoevsky, too, was enchanted by the temptation story. mak­
ing it the crux of Ivan Karamazov's parable of the Grand Inquisitor. 
NEEDS, RIGHTS, AND LOVE OF THE WHOLE 
Solovicv's critique of abstract principles began with the collectivist option, 
represented in his time by socialism. 5010viev was reasonably well ac­
quainted with socialism. In his youth he had been deeply impressed by 
reading Saint-Simon and other early socialists, and he always evinced more 
sympathy for socialism than for capitalism.2s In his estimation, socialists 
art~ right to reject plutocracy and demand an economic order embodying 
ethical norms. The error of socialism lies in supposing that a material or 
economic order by itself generates ethical norms, "that an unexampled eco­
nomic set-up (some kind of fusion of capital and labor, the organization of 
industry by unions, etc.) is obligatory in and for itself. unconditionally nor­
mative and moral, that is. that this economic set-up as such already con­
tavos a mora) principle and is the sale condition of social morality." This is a 
classic example of partiality: "the moral principle, the principle of the oblig­
atory and the normative, is determ ined exclusively by one of the elements of 
the totality of human life-the economic element.''26 
Other elements, besides the material-economic, need to be accommo­
dated in a social ethic. One of them is betrayed by the rhetoric of socialism 
itself. Socialists typically cloak the economic arrangements they preach in 
a moral discourse that reveals the transeconomic status of their ideal. 50­
cialists call for a "just" economy and the "rights" of workers. But the con­
cepts of justice and right cannot be derived from the material-economic 
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process. Interests can be derived from it, but not rights. Rights derive from 
the freedom and rationality of human beings, features of human nature 
that are by definition spiritual. That such values should be realized in and 
through the economic order, that the latter should not be abandoned to 
anarchy while so-called spiritual people seek ha ppi ness inanother world­
these demands of socialism are quite valid. But that matter in motion and 
the interests generated by it are the source of freedom and rationality is a 
proposition Soloviev rejected. Far from being a derivative of the economic 
order, our consciousness of freedom and rationality points to something 
else: the juridical order. 
A powerful personalism underlay Soloviev's appreciation for the reality 
of the juridical order: 
The concept of rigl\( first lends to a human being the status of person. In­
deed, as long as I strive for material prosperity and pursue my personal in­
terests, other people have no independent significance for me, they are 
merel)' thi ngs which ( can use well or poorly lin pursuit of my interests]. But 
if 1acknowledge that other people are not only useful to me but have rights 
in and for themselves, rights by vi rtue of wh ich they determi ne my act ivity 
just as much as they are determined by it; if, when [ encounter the right of 
another, I must say to myself, this far and no further-by this very fact [ 
acknowledge in the other something unalterable and unconditional. some­
thi ng that cannot serve as the means o( my material interest, and conse­
quently something higher than this interest; the other becomes something 
sacred to me, that is, ceases to be a thing, becomes a person.27 
TIle discovery of the juridical order represents a step forward on the path 
to realizing an ethical society, a kingdom of ends in which all respect the 
rightful claims of each, and each the rightful claims of all. But again, the 
task is more difficult in practice than in theory. The juridical otder is no 
more immune than the economic order to the spell of abstract principles. In 
the case of law, the warring abstractions are an organic or genetic under­
standing of law-what Soloviev called the "abstract-historical concept of 
law"-and the idea of law as an external or mechanical social contract, the 
"abstract-utilitaria n concept of law." He was referring to the split between 
historicist and rationalist philosophies of law, the former usually lin ked 
with Romantic conservatism, the latter with liberalism or revolution, 
As always, the partisans of each abstraction tend to be right in what 
they affirm but wrong in what they suppress or deny. The historicists are 
right to insist that law does not spring full-grown and armed from the 
heads of political theorists but is historically embedded. Soloviev, whose 
debt to Slavophilism has been noted, accepted this point without diffi­
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culty. Aboriginally, aU law is customary law in which "the principle of jus­
tice functions not as a pri nciple that is theoretically grasped but as an 
immediate moral instinct or practicaJ reason expressing itself in the form 
of symbols:'28 But historicists err when they suppose that the essence of 
law is sat isfactori Jy accounted for by its historical origi ns. 1h i sis tanta­
mount to replacing theory of law with history of law, which is to commit 
the logical error of "taking the origin or genesis of a thing in empirical re­
ality to be the essence of that thing, confusing the historica I order with 
the logical order, and losing the content of a thing in the process through 
whi£h it is manifested."29 Although historically conditioned, law possesses 
formal properties without which it would not be law, properties that are 
gradually cia ritied in the historical process itself by the emergence of con­
cepts of personhood and freedom. Here is where the essence of law must 
be sought. 
Still, there is a right way and a wrong way to seek this essence. The 
wrong way is to seize upon the formal personhood implicit in the concept 
of law and, isolating it from the historical process, to absolutize it. The 
sovereign individual who supposedly precedes history and enters into a 
contract with his fellows as a means of pursu ing his ends is an abstrac­
tion. Historicists are right to reject it as purely hypothetical, a formula for 
utopianism. Soloviev sought a middle way between utopianism and Ro­
mantic conservatism in a formula acknowledging both the free-personal 
and the socia I aspects of law: "Law is freedom cQnditioned by equality," or 
"the synthesis o/freedom and equalily."3o 
The crafting of a defi n ition of law provided Soloviev with an occasion to 
c1al'ify his concept of natural law. Soloviev rejected the concept in the 
sense of an actual ordering of life preceding the rise of political associa­
tions in a supposed state of nature. To think of natural law in this way is 
"to take an intellectual abstraction for reality:' But the concept is useful as 
an expression of the necessary formal properties which positive law must 
reflect, "to the extent that it is rea]]y law and not something else"; 
The concepts of personhood, freedom, and equality constitute the essence of 
so-called natural law. The rational essence of law i~ distinguished from its 
historical manifestation, namely positive law. In this sense, natural law is 
that general algebraic formula into which history inserts the various real 
quantities of positive law; it exists in reality only as the general form of all 
positive legal relations, in them and through them.3] 
One of the prominent themes of The Critique ofAbstract Principles is the 
essentially negative character of law. The idea is that law sets boundaries 
and establishes rules but does not prescribe moral content or ends. "For 
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[law] there is no normative end, no normative will or intention. Heroic self· 
sacrifice and selfish calculation make no difference to law; it does not de­
mand the former and does not forbid the latter. A lawful government, in its 
ordinances, does not and cannot demand that all should assist each, and 
each all; it demands only that no one should do harm to anyone else."32 In 
The Justification ofthe Good (1897), written much later in his career, Solo­
viev changed his mind on this poinl, having come to see that law and mo­
rality, while by no means identical, are organically linked in ways that the 
unsubtle distinctions of The Critique failed to accommodate. The rather ar­
tificial disjunction of"negative" law from "positive" morality in 1he Critique 
is probably to be explained by Soloviev's youthful enthusiasm for Schopen­
hauer, who made much of the distinction between the supposedly negative 
ethic of justice and the positive ethic of compassioo.33 
The motivation of Soloviev's negative theory of law seems to be moral and 
metaphysical rather than juridica1, a pretext for an observation about the 
grandeur and misery of human beings as such. Law is grounded in meta­
physical personhood (freedom and reason), the inalienable glory of the hu­
man being. But human beings have the capacity to misuse their personhood, 
"quite fully justifying Mephistopheles' observation in Goethe's Faust": 
fin wenIg besser wurd' er leben
 
Hatt'st Du ihm nicht den Schein des Hinunelslichts gegeben;
 
Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht's alJein,
 
NUT tierischer als jedes Tier zu sein.34
 
Thus personhood threatens to collapse into the abyss; the hoped-for 
kingdom of ends, into a barely domesticated anarchy of interests. 1his is 
surely a miserable outcome, unless of course one has overlooked the place 
where the truly worthy end of human life is to be found. "Unconditional 
form demands unconditional content. Beyond the legal order, the order of 
negative means, must stand a positi VI' order defi ned by an absolute end."35 
Soloviev was confident about the availability of an absolute end because 
he had already posited it. The absolute end is the whole of things, the sym­
phonic unity that transcends abstractions, the Living One that gives life 
to all else. 
Soloviev argued the case for the absolute end anthropologically, proceed­
ing from the observable nature of human beings. The paradox of human be­
ings is that they do not seem to be content with being themselves, that is to 
say, free, rational agents. They are drawn in two other directions as well: to 
the material world, which they love with a passion, and to the world of di­
vine and demonic forces. "It is impossible to eliminate the fact that the hu­
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man being appears to himself to be not just a human being but also and 
cqua 11 y an ani ma Iand a god." The passions of the flesh and "the mystica Iat­
tractions making [the human being] a divine or demonic being" profoundly 
complicate human Iife.'l6 To deny these forces is to exchange actual human 
nature for the abstract model constructed by rationalism. 
Mystical attractions are the various ways in which human beings are 
grasped by the desire to unite with all things, the yearning "to be all." In 
practical terms this ca n only mea n attach ing oneseIf somehow to the whole 
of things, since it is obvious that "the infinitely small unit" that is a human 
being cannot in fact be all. The desire to unite with the whole is the essence 
of what Soloviev ca lis the "religious principle." The contrast with the juridi­
cal order is clear: law demarcates, delimits, distinguishes, divides; religion 
connects, embraces, unites. Put another way, religion is about love-the lov­
ing union realized in "a mystical or religious community, that is to say, the 
church."37 Loving union with the whole of things is the absolute end. 
FREE THEOCRl\CY 
The clarification of the religious principle of love, while revealing the end 
of life, complicates the actual busi ness of living because of the tension be­
tween love and law. The tension would not be a problem if these values 
could be confined to separate spheres. But this is not possible. The reli­
gious and juridical principles are both moral principles; they pertain to 
"one and the same sphere, namely the sphere of practical, moral or social 
life.~ Soloviev regarded attempts to reconcile the two principles through 
compartmentalization as flawed. for example, he denied "that I could ac­
tually show Christian love to a neighbor whom, in my capacity as a judge, 
r send to the gallows." Love and law demand acknowledgment from the 
same person at the same time in the same society. An "inner, harmonious 
relation or synthesis" of the two must be establ ished. But how? Soloviev's 
answer was, through a "free theocracy."38 
To avoid misunderstanding Soloviev's proposal. it is crucial to under­
score the at tributive "free." Admittedly, readers who a re put off by the term 
"theocracy" in the first place will regard "free theocracy" as an oxymoron. 
But Soloviev was quite serious about the idea, taking pains to distinguish it 
from what he called "false theocracy" or "abstract clericalism." False the­
Ocracy results from the absolutization of the religious principle, that is to 
say, from developing the religious element in human life in isolation from 
the athers and so ma kin g it into an abstract pr inciple. Th is is what happens 
in traditional theocracies where religious forces dominate all others and 
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dictate to society. The antidote to this pathology is freedom; freedom of 
conscience first of all, and more generally the freedom to exercise rational­
ity in all sectors of life. Soloviev's conceptuality here parallels h is view of 
the right relationsh ip between the juridica I order and economic interest: 
economic initiative should not be abolished or suppressed by the law, even 
though law is the higher good. Similarly, the religious principle transcends 
the juridical, both metaphysically (it expresses the whole of things) and 
practically (love transcends law). But it must not abolish the juridical Or­
der. The juridical order is to be affirmed and incorporated into the free­
theocratic synthesis. As Soloviev saw it, a theocracy that violates the 
free-rational rule of law vitiates not only law but a) so religion itself and the 
God it claims to serve. In false theocracy God is reduced to "thunder and 
lightning which extinguish completely the still small voice of reason and 
conscience."J9 But reason and conscience, and the material world itself, are 
God-given. A free theocracy must embrace them fully. 
In his criticism of traditional theocracy, Soloviev clearly sought to 
distance himself from the religious and political conservatives of his day. 
Yet he also distanced himself from the doctrinaire liberals. Nineteenth­
century European liberals, if they did not wish to expel religion from soci­
ety altogether, usually embraced the formula of "a free church in a free 
state" to express the proper relationship between the juridical and religious 
principles. Soloviev rejected this formula. He accepted the need to distin­
guish between church and state, but not the isolation of the church from 
the state, which he believed the formula implied. He agreed that in a cleri­
calist theocracy there is not enough space between church and state. But in 
a secularist liberal state there is not enough interaction. Soloviev believed 
that a sharp separation between the juridical and religious spheres is unre­
alistic, for in. actual life, religion and law interact in all sorts of concrete 
ways. They should interact, for without a dynamic relationship, no synthe­
sis of elements can be achieved. or course, the synthesis must be realized 
in such a way as to affirm the ultimacy of the religious principle in the hier­
archy of values. Otherwise the more inclusive principle is subordinated to 
the less. Soloviev preached theocracy, not nomocracy. 
Soloviev knew that many modern legal and political thinkers rejected a 
value hierarchy grounded in religion, viewing "the state as the highest and 
final form of human society and the universal kingdom of law as the apo­
gee of human history."1o This statist ultimate would be valid only ifhuman 
beings were free-rational creatures and nothing more. But they are more. A 
human being is "a being comprising in himself(in the absolute order) a di­
vine idea, that is to say, the whole of things or unconditiona I fullness of be­
ing, and realizing this idea (in the natural order) by means of rational 
freedom in material nature." 41 Creatures with such an all-embracing na­
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ture need more than the state to order their affairs and give them peace; 
they need a church that embraces t he whole of life from its materiaIsu rface 
to its divine ground. Beyond a just society, they need a loving community; 
beyond their fellow human beings, fellowship with God; beyond the king­
dom of ends, the kingdom of God. 
Historical imagination is required to appreciate what Soloviev's theoc­
racy meant in his time and how it might be relevant to the twenty-first 
century world. Soloviev actually lived in a kind of theocracy, for in the 
nineteenth-century, Russia was still an Orthodox Christian empire. Only 
secularized elites and the religious minorities questioned the arrangement. 
Most Russians along with their rulers regarded themselves as trustees of 
Orthodoxy (to them, true Christianity). Placing Soloviev's free theocracy 
against this background, one can see that his project was to a considerable 
extent a critical enterprise. 5oloviev challenged his compatriots to mea­
sure the existing theocracy against the ideal concept. So, for example, 50­
loviev argued that freedom of conscience was an essential requirement in a 
true theocracy; yet there was no freedom of conscience in the Russian Em­
pire in his lifetime. He argued that the free exercise of reason and the 
healthy pursuit of material interests without ascetical interference were 
consistent with a true theocracy, but these prescriptions hardly described 
the conditions of intellectual and social life In tsarist Russia. An essentially 
prophetic idea, Soloviev'sfree theocracy challenged the status quo. 
At the same time, by preaching free theocracy, Soloviev made it clear that 
he did not finally agree with the secularist critics of Russia. The need for an 
establishment of religious values at the heart of society seemed clear to him; 
and that this establishment should be sealed by a Christian monarchy was 
agreeable to him as well. His celebrated appeal to Alexander III to spare the 
regicides of 1881 assumed the existence of a Christian monarch. Soloviev did 
not wish to abolish the office but to reinvigorate it. Although he became 
more critical of the tsarist state later in his career, Soloviev never embraced 
republicanism or "post-Constantinian" Christianity, nor for that matter did 
manyofhis heirs in the next generation. In the essay on Leo xnr in the Cath­
olic companion to this volume. Russell Hittinger traces the elimination of 
national churches and "political Christendom" in nineteenth-century Ca­
tholicism leading to the view that the church is not in the state, nor the state 
in the church.42 No such process was at work in nineteenth-century Ortho­
doxy, and even the catastrophes of the twentieth century have not com­
pletely dislodged the idea of a national church. Soloviev presents a good 
example of the ideal of national or Constantin ian Christianity in action. 
Besides his COllstantinianism, Soloviev's theocrat ism was a response 
to the idea of the kingdom of God in the gospel. By recogn izing the cen­
trality of the kingdom in the Christian message, Soloviev was ahead of 
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his time. TIle majority of Christian theologians and ethicists in the nine­
teenth century were tone-deaf to the theocratic theme in the gospel. For 
them, lesus preached an inner, spiritual kingdom that was to be sharply 
distinguished from the supposedly crude, nationalist theocracy of the 
Jews. Soloviev rejected this one-sided spiritualizing of the gospel along 
with its anti-Semitic implications. In th is he anticipated Albert Sch­
weitzer and others who rediscovered the Jewish apocalyptic roots of 
C hr istia n i ty at the turn of t he cent ury. He also ant ieipated twentiet h­
century theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Martin Luther King, and 
10hn Howard Yoder, who demonstrated the political seriousness of the 
gospel.43 
Soloviev's theocratism also expressed his vision of a universal love 
ethic as the practica I essence of Christianity. Soloviev did not believe 
that a love ethic could be grounded in either the natural-economic or 
the rational-jurid ical order of things. In the natural order, love occurs as 
an instinct or passion, but there is no way to build an ethic of uni ....ersal 
love (" the inner, essen ti aI sol ida rit y of all things") on thi s fou ndat ion. Love 
as an instinct is too random; its range of application is too narrow. One 
naturally loves family, friends, close neighbors-but "all and each?~ A love 
ethic cannot be grounded in the rational-juridical order of things, either. 
Here human beings are recognized as free rational agents; but there is no 
love, not even in the form of instinct or passion. The rational order of 
things is just that: rational, intellectual. Huma n beings are not appreci­
ated as "living people but only as abstract juridical persons" by virtue of 
the characteristics they share with all other human beings. It cannot be 
otherwise. The grandeur of the rational-juridical order lies precisely in its 
generality and impersonality, its applicability to all human beings regard­
less of their preferences. passions, loves, or hates. Proclaiming love as the 
constitutive principle of the rational order of things would be the philo­
sophical equivalent of a judge or jury deciding cases on the basis of their 
personal feelings for the individuals involved.44 
The true ground of love lies in the mystical or divine order of things. To 
function as a moral principle as distinguished from an accidental passion, 
love must be "at one and the same time (t livingpersonalforce and a unil'ersal 
law," But this is nothing less than a description of God, the absolute ground 
of being. Love in the natural world is a force but not a universal law, and its 
personal status is moot. In the rational order of things there is universal law 
but no love. indeed no actual living beings. God is both love and law. This is 
a unity transcending reason, which is why Soloviev describes it as "mystical," 
or, in the social-political context. "theocratic." An ethic of universal love is an 
ethic of absolute relatedness or connectedness. One loves and serves one's 
fellow human beings as ends in themselves when one recognizes them as 
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ends in God, acknowledging them as beings with the "power to become chil­
dren of God" (John l:l2), beings whose destiny is theosis:15 
The concept of theonomy. a terminological cousin of theocracy, might 
shed light on what Soloviev has in mind. The term came into currency in 
English-speaking theology thanks to PaUl Tillich, whose thought resembles 
Soloviev's in a number of ways. TilJich's project in ethics and social philoso­
phy was to transcend the antagonism between heteronomy (Soloviev's false 
theocracy) and autonomy (Soloviev's rational-juridical order) in an ethic of 
theonomy (SoloYiev's theocracy of love). A theonomous ethic retains the 
virtues of heteronomy and autonomy (reverence and freedom) while shed­
ding the defects (authoritarianism and selfishness) and leading us through 
love to the divine ground of being. Theonomy may be a better name for 50­
loviev's ideal than theocracy, which suggests a vicariate of some kind.46 
JUSTICE AS THE fRAMEWORK OF LOVE 
What is the impact of an et h ic of un iversallove on Jaw? [n the history of re­
ligion and ethics, preachers of universal love have often been suspicious of 
law, even contemptuous of it. In Russia. Leo Tolstoy preached a Christian 
ethic that rejected the legal system and the state as such. 50loviev saw the 
matter differently. True, love stands above law in Soloviev's hierarchy of val· 
ues. But unlike to in kers for whom hierarchy is a pretext for forgett ing about 
everything below the apex, Soloviev recognized that the point of a hierarchy 
is to do justice to all its components. The ideal of universal love springs from 
the ecstatic connectedness of human beings to the divine ground of being, 
but this love cannot be actualized by human beings as it is in the divine 
ground. TI1at would be possible only if human beings had already achieved 
theosis; but in fact they are unfl nished creatures. Therefore universal love, 
although inspired from above ("mystically"). must be sought in and through 
engagement with the economic and juridical spheres. 
Soloviev's point can be seen in his interpretation of the biblical ac­
COUIlt of the creation of human beings. In Genesis }-2 human beings 
are said to be created "from the dust of the earth," "in (God's] image," 
and "according to [God'sl likeness." Soloviev insisted that all three 
points are essential to a proper understanding of human nature. As 
dust of the earth, human beings are weak and imperfect, separated 
from God. As bearers of the image of God, they are endowed with the 
idea of perfection, a vision of the goodness and beauty wh ich they lack. 
As shaped by the "likeness" of God, human beings are filled with the 
desire to conform themselves to the divine image, to be assimilated to 
the divine beauty. Three moments of moral experience follow from 
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these determ inations: confession of imperfection. contemplation of 
perfection, and the process of actually becom ing perfect.47 All three 
moments are important. A corresponding relatedness exists between 
the economic, juridical, and religious spheres. 
In the case of love and law. Soloviev formulated the right relationship as: 
qjustice is the necessaryframework oflove."4~ That is to say. love without re­
spect for law will be defective, cut loose from its moori ngs in the ontologi­
cal hierarchy and doomed to distortion through sentimentalization, 
self-deception, demonic obsession, or other pathologies. For example, one's 
love is defective if one loves a person without respecting that person's 
rights. That is how slave owners and serf owners "loved" their servants. A 
human being is a free, rational creature; and a free, rational creatu re, as ju­
ridical theory makes plain, is a creature endowed with inalienable rights. 
To violate these rights, or not to perceive them in the first place, amounts 
to treating a human being as something other than a human being. No ap­
peal to "Iove" can rectify this original wrong. Justice is the indispensable 
framework of human relations. 
LAW AND THE GOOD 
Soloviev's most developed philosophy oflaw is found in his magnum opus, 
The Justification ofthe Good (1897), and in Law and Morality, a collection 
of essays that came out the same year.49 In both works Soloviev treated 
philosoph}' of law as a branch of moral philosophy. 1he task of moral phi­
losophy is "the justification of the Good," But what is the Good? And what 
does it mean to justify it? 
By the Good, Soloviev meant the source of all value, that which lends 
meaning to the whole of life, the Good as distinguished from goods. All hu­
man beings recognize certain goods; but a list of goods does not address the 
issue of goodness as such. Goods. viewed analytically, are partial; they do not 
embrace the whole of life. The moral philosopher is looking for that which 
ties the partial goods together. To put it in Tillichian language, the moral 
philosopher seeks the ultimate concern of human beings as moral agents. 
Many moral philosophers would reject this line of inquiry because it 
assumes that only an overarching Good can satisfy the human moral 
quest. What warrants this assumption? Soloviev believed it is warranted 
by the nature and destiny of human beings: 
"Know ye not that we shall judge angels?" (1 Cor. 6:3] St. Paul writes to the 
faithful. And if even the heavenly things are subject to our judgment, this is 
still more true of all earthly things. Man is jl) principle or ill his destination 
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an uncondlllOnal inner form of the good as an unconditional content; all 
else is conditioned and relative.so 
Here Soloviev stepped forward in the mantle of theocratic prophecy 
and Orthodox mysticism to relate the justification of the Good not just to 
the partial. unfinished world of the present, but also to the consummated 
kingdom of God. Human beings are conditioned by nature and history 
but open to eternity, destined for theosis. They bear the unconditional 
form of the unconditional Good. 
The unconditional Good as Soloviev envisioned it bears three charac­
teristics, all of which have ethical relevance: 
The good as such is not conditioned by anything, but itself conditions all 
things, and is realized through all things. In so far as the good is not condi­
tjoned by anythi ng, it is pure; in so far as it conditions all things, it is all­
embracing; and In so far as it is realized through all things, it is all-powEljul."l 
Without a standard of purity, human beings cannot make the clear dis­
tin<;tion between good and evil that is the essence of moral choice. With­
out the all-inclusiveness of the Good, morality breaks up into mutually 
contradictory dema nds. ~ Fi na Ily, if t he good had no power, if it cou ld not in 
the end triumph over everything, including 'the last enemy death' [1 Cor. 
lS:26]-life would be in vain.'·52 Such is the Good, which the moral philoso­
pher seeks to know. Most people call it God. 
If the Good is God, what did Soloviev mean by justification? Did he pre­
sume to justify God? His preface to the second edition of The Justification 
ofthe Good sheds light on the question: 
The object of this book is to show the good as truth and righteousness, [hat is, 
as the only right and consistent way ofHre in all things and to the end, for all 
who decide to follow it. I mean the Good as such; it alone Justifies itself and 
justifies our confidence in it. And it is not for nothing that before the open 
grave. when all else has obviously failed, we call to this essential Good and 
say. ~Blessed art Thou, 0 Lord, for Thou has taught [me] Thy justification" 
IPs. 119: uj.53 
Soloviev was not proposi ng to just if'f the ways of God to man. The Good 
justifies itself. Human beings are justified by standing in a relationship to 
the Good, for which Soloviev finds the paradigm at the utter limit of hu­
man life where human weakness ca nnot be denied, but where the deceased 
nevertheless "speaks" from the dust through the mouth of the priest to 
bless God in the words of the great Psalm of the Law. The Slavonic version 
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of Psalms lJ9:12 pertains to the title of Soloviev's book: "teach me thy justi­
fication" (l1auchi mia opraJldaniem Tvoim; Hebr. "thy statutes"), that is, 
teach me to see and acknowledge you rather than miss you, to see you as 
the Good. This is the Orthodox contemplative version of what Protestants 
call justification by faith. Human beings do not justify the Good by doing 
it. If that were true, the Good would depend on human beings, whereas the 
opposite is the case. 
A word of clarification is required here, however. One should not sup­
pose that appreciating the Good i11 itselfmeans regarding the Good by it­
self, that is to say, construing it in isolation from the world. It is possible to 
think about the Good in this way, but the consequence of such thinking is 
to reduce the Good to an abstract principle. Because human life is embod­
ied and historical, seeing the Good means seeing it in and through the 
world, seeing the Good in all things and all things in the Good. This is not 
easy to do precisely because of the embodied character of human life with 
its pressures and distractions. But prayer, religious instruction, and moral 
philosophy can help. 
The connectedness of the Good to the world, that is, the fullness and 
wholeness (vseedinstvo) of the Good, is the primary focus of The Justifica­
tion of the Good. The themes of purity and power receive less at tent ion. 
Soloviev believed that the purity of the Good received unsurpassed treat­
ment in Kant's moral philosophy. Soloviev did not try to better the Ger­
man master on this point. But Kant did not investigate how the Good 
enters into the immense process of 1ife. His mora1v is ion, while beautiful 
in formal terms, lacked actuality and suffered from formalism. Soloviev 
proposed to focus on the actualization of the Good through the "complete 
and exhaustive moral norms for all the fundamental practical relations of 
individual and collective Iife. ff54 
The Justification ofthe Good, in its very title, shows how far Soloviev stood 
from anything resembli ng a divine command theory of ethics. The idea that 
morality means doing what God commands raises the question that Soc rates 
and Euthyphro debated more than two millennia ago: is something good 
because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good? For 
Soloviev, the very form of the question is wrong because it dissociates in 
principle what is never dissociated in actuality, namely, God and the Good. 
God and the Good are the same ultimate reality and are differentiated only 
perspectivally depending on the aspect of the whole of things under consid­
eration in a given context. In a work of moral philosophy, the Good is the ap­
propriate term. Hence Socrates was right to argue against Euthyphro that 
God commands only the good and, in the Republic, to argue that God is 
good. However, this must not be taken to mean that the Good is something 
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other than God, since the Good as Plato and Soloviev described it-the un­
conditionally pure, full. ever-living source of all value-is obviously divine. 
To posit God apart from the Good or the Good apart form God is to create 
abstract principles, to generate the anticosmic ideologies of godless human­
ism (autonomy) and goodless religion (heteronomy). Both fail to do justice 
to the presence ofGod/Good in the actual grace-filled world. 
The Russian word for grace, blagodat: is helpful on this point. The term 
is a compound of blago ("good") and dat' ("give"); hence, the good that is 
given, or good gift. Western and especially Protestant theories of grace 
emphasize the act of giving as opposed to the gift. The Russian term sug­
gests a more balanced view: grace is the free act of giving but also that 
which is given, namely the Good.55 In adopting this view, Soloviev af­
firmed the traditional understanding of grace in the Orthodox tradition. 
lhe anticosmic dualism of nature and grace so common in Western theol­
ogy is foreign to Orthodoxy, ancient and modern. 
An oblique illustration of the difference between East and West on this 
point is found in Leslie Griffi,n's essay on Pope John XXIII included in the 
Catholk companion to this volume. Griffin cites Cardinal Suenens's at­
tempt to express what was special about Angelo Roncalli: 
Ifone had to express it all in one word, it seems to me that one could say that 
John XXIII was a man surprisingly natural and at the same time supernatu­
ral. Nature and grace produced in him a living unity filled with charm and 
surprises. Everything about him sprang from a single source. In a completely 
natural way he was supernatural. He was natural with such a supernatural 
spirit that no one detected a distinction between the twO.'>6 
From an Orthodox point of view the only problem here is that the car­
dinal treats as an exception what should be seen as the rule, that is, as the 
norm of creation and sanctification alike. "A living unity [of nature and 
gracel filled with charm and surprises" is a good description of what the 
whole cosmos looked like in the beginning, still looks like in the Jives of 
the saints and will look like in a more wonderful way in the realized king­
domofGod. 
THE PRIMARY DATA Of MORALlTY 
The Justification ofthe Good is a massive work, but its design is econom­
ical. Soloviev divided his subject into three parts: the Good in human 
nature, the Good from God, and the Good in the course of history. That is 
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to say, one may see the Good in humanity. in divinity and in the divine­
human process. 
In this book Soloviev approached the discussion of human nature in a 
rather unexpected way. Rather than capturing his subject in a formal defi­
nition as he did in The Critique ofAbstract Principles, or through a meta­
physical doctrine of freedom, or a theological affirmation of the image of 
God, Soloviev undertook a quasi-empirica I investigation of what he called 
qthe primary data of mora Iity."57 By these he meant universally observable 
facts of human behavior that betoken moral consciousness and serve as 
the foundation for the higher moral principles. The three primary data are 
shame, compassion, and reverence. Shame, which expresses itself first of 
all in sexual modesty, is the evidence that human beings regard themselves 
as beings transcending material nature. The moral principle that arises 
from shame is asceticism (discipline, self-control). Compassion for suffer­
ing companions shows that human beings are other-regarding creatures 
cognizant of the neighbor's right to exist. The moral principle here is jus­
tice. Reverence, appeari ng first in the awe that children feel toward their 
parents, shows that human beings seek an object of worship. From rever­
ence comes piety, or the religious principle. Taken together, the three prin­
ciples deflne the right relationship to the whole of life: to nature through 
ascetic ism; to hu man bei ngs through justice: to God through worsh ip. 
Soloviev used this scheme once before, in The Spiritual Foundations of 
Life (1882-84), where he described spirituality as consisting of prayer, sac­
rifice or almsgiving. and fasting.S$ The order is reversed, but the terms are 
the same: reverence, compassion, and shame. 
In The Spiritual Foundations ofLife Soloviev's purpose was edification. 
not systematic philosophy. In The Just!fication of the Good, however, Solo­
viev took as his task to show that the "primary data" are universal and logi­
cally bound to the principles he derived from them. This was not easy to 
do, as critics were quick to point out. In a long and extremely negative re­
view of Tlte Justification of the Good, the distinguished political and legal 
philosopher Boris Chicherin argued that Soloviey's treatment of the sup­
posedly primary data of morality was arbitrary.'i9 Take the case of shame. 
Soloviev believed that the modesty human beings feel about sexuality be­
tokens an awareness of their transcendence over material nature, hence 
the begin nings of asceticism. Even if we grant that feel ings of modesty to­
ward sex are universal-a proposition that field anthropologists would 
have to evaluate-Chicherin pointed out that other reasons besides asceti­
cism could be adduced to explain it. Far from implying transcendence over 
material nature, sexual restraint might be a biological adaptation to pro­
tect health and further the enjoyment of material nature. Chicherin also 
rejected the notion that shame as a moral phenomenon implies asceticism. 
VladimIr SOIOV1€V (1853-1900) ~ 57 
Human beings often feel shame because of a deficit of passions or posses­
sions: shame over weakness. poverty, sexual inadequacy, and so on. 
Chicherin accused Soloviev of making an unwarranted leap from behav­
ioral fact (if it is a fact) to moral principle. The same problem attended Solo­
"iev's move from natural compassion to justice and right, and his attempt to 
ground belief in God ina fee! ing of awe rat her than in reason. Chicherin be­
lieved that Soloviev had been seduced by "the empiricist school now holding 
sway" in European intellectual culture. For Chicherin, what is needed in 
moral philosophy is not just facts-a "shaky foundation" for systematic 
thought-but first principles, or metaphysics.~o 
It is not difficult to appreciate Chicherin's criticism of Soloviev's ac­
count of primordial human nature. That SoJoviev discovered three "pri­
mary data" of morality-not two, or four, or more-is obviously related 
to his abstract outline: morality in relation to that which is below hu­
man beings (material nature). on a par (fellow humans). and above them 
(God). The outline is elegant but can scarcely be said to emerge from an 
investigation offacts. The facts have been selected to fit the outline. Still, 
it is worth asking why Soloviev began his most comprehensive work of 
moral philosophy in this way.61 Chicherin's explanation-that Soloviev 
was seduced by empiricism-is implausible. lhc thinker who inspired 
the passionate interest in God. freedom, and immortality in the Russian 
religious-ph ilosophical renaissance of t he next generation was not blind 
to the metaphysics of morals. 
One way of accounti ng for Soloviev's treatment of human nature in The 
Justification of the Good is to see it as an experiment in embodied or ap­
plied metaphysics, a rudimentary phenomenology. One must remember 
that Soloviev's aim in the Justification oj the Good was not to make the 
theoretical case for God. freedom, and immortality but to show how God, 
freedom, and immortality enter into actual human experience. It is ap­
propriate. then, that the author began his book not with first principles 
but with first phenomena; and in point offact 7he/ustification ofthe Good 
is one of the most concrete works in the Solovievian corpus. A wide range 
of social issues, including nationalism, crime and punishment. war. and 
economic justice. is discussed. 
LAW AND COLLeCTIVE EVIL 
Given that the issues treated in The Justification of the Good have to do 
mainly with public order, it is not surprising that Soloviev also devoted a 
good deal of attention to law. Soloviev's interest in "collective evil" 
(sobiratel'noe zio) rein forced h is attention to the subject: if collect ive 
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evil demands attention, so presumably does the collective norm-setting 
designed to combat it.62 The fact that Soloviev recognized collective evil 
as a matter demanding attention in its own right is significant in itself. 
Many nineteenth -centu ry Christian moral ists rega rded soci aI mora Iity 
as an extension of individual morality. Soloviev rejected such "abstract 
subjec tiv ism.~63 
Soloviev identi fied th ree qui ntessent ial ma n i festations 0 f collect ive evil 
in society: the immoral relations between nations, between society and 
the cri minai, and between social classes. The first evil manifested itself in 
nationalism; the second, in vengeful and punitive judicial practices such 
as capital punishment; the third, in economic injustice, the coexistence of 
luxury and squalor. A separate chapter of The Justification ofthe Good was 
devoted to each of these problems. fo4 
On the national question Soloviev tried to steer a middle course between 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism (the latter based on "the abstract man in 
general of the philosophers and jurists"). The evangelical commandment to 
love one's neighbor as oneself transcends national boundaries and rules out 
national egoism. However, the actual neighbor is never an abstract being 
but is always embedded in a specific tribe, people, or nation. Therefore the 
evangelical commandment must also be taken to mean: "Love all other na­
tions as your own." While the Christian is not called to be a "human being 
in general" (obshchechelollek), he is called to be a "pan-human" or "universal 
man" (vsechelovek). Soloviev preached a pluralist, historically concrete 
internationalism.65 
A full discussion of internationalism and international law is not found in 
The Justification ofthe Good, although Soloviev dealt with these subjects by 
implication in his late essays on war. A chapter on war forms part of The 
lustification ofthe Good,66 and his last book, Three Dialogues on War, Prog­
ress and the End ofWorld History, with a BriefTale ofthe Anti-Christ (1899­
1900), offered a fuller discussion of the same theme.67 In both essays, 
Soloviev aimed to challenge Tolstoyan pacifism, then at the height of its 
popularity in Russia. SoJoviev's argument was simple and sobering: that 
Christian love requires us to protect the defenseless when it is in our power 
to do so, by force if necessary. Or more colorfully: after the murder of Abel 
by Cain, "justly fearing lest the same thing should happen to Seth and other 
peaceful men, the guardian angels of humanity mixed clay with copper and 
iron and created the soldier and the policeman.''''s [n Three Dialogues 5010­
viev used a recent hisLOrical example: the ethnic cleansing of Armenia by 
Turkish and Kurdish irregulars during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, a 
wound reopened by the Armenian Massacres of 1895. As a nineteenth­
century progressivist, Soloviev believed strongly in "the approaching end of 
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[alll wars:' but he also believed that "it would be irrational ... to think and 
to act as though that approaching end had already come."69 
Soloviev's views on wa[ were not always well received by the liberal 
Christian circles that were his natural audience. 111e reservations ex­
pressed by the reviewer of The Justification ofthe Good in the official jour­
nal of the Moscow Theological Academy, The Theological Herald, are a 
case j n point. The reviewer reeogn ized that in Justification ofthe Good 50­
loviev was attempting to make the case for the "relative good" against ab­
solutists of va rious types, but he felt that the clarity of the evangelical love 
ethic was sometimes obscured rather than illuminated by Soloviev's mod­
eration. The critic was prepared to acknowledge that war had brought cer­
tain benefits to civilization; however, 
this does not prevent us from feeling greater sympathy for those moralists 
who actively summon us to cast off this inhuman means of civilization than 
for those who try to sooth our conscience by pointing out that the individual 
soldier does not harbor evillOtentions toward any particular human being, 
"~specially with the present method oj fighting by means of guns and can­
nons against an enemy who is too far off to be seen." We agree with Mr. Solo­
viev that one cannot survive without the "relative good." But a moralist 
should be as careful as possible with his" justification" because, having set 
foot on this slippery slope, it IS easy to go too far.'o 
In his treatment of criminal justice 5010viev again attempted to steer a 
middle course between Tolstoyan Christianity, which rejected criminal 
law, and its opposite, the traditiona I view of justice as vengeance or retri­
bution. Both extremes fail to see the essential hallmark of justice, wh ieh 
is not force or retribution but "right:' In a system of criminal justice there 
are th ree rights to be reckoned with: the right of the injured party to de­
fense and compensation; the right of society to security; and the right of 
the crimi nal "to correction and reformation."'\ The first two rights are 
universally accepted. The th ird is controversial, for it entails rejecting ju­
dicial practices that assail the human ity of the criminal. These include 
not just bloody and cruel acts of vengeance but also any type of punish­
ment that treats the offender si mply as a means to an end. Th is is why 50­
loviev rejected capital punishment. The traditiona I justification of the 
practice in terms of vengeance or retribution clearly violates the principle 
of right, wh ich is the basis of justice. TIle modern argument for the death 
penalty as a deterrent is equally bad in his opinion because it reduces a 
human being to the status of a means only and so undermines the com­
mOn good: 
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The common good is common only because it contains in itself the good of 
all individual persons without exception-otherwise it would be only the 
good of the majority.... But from the concept of the common good [itl fol­
lows with logical necessity that, while limiting particular interests and aspi­
rations precisely as common (by common boundaries), it in no way can 
abolish even one bearer of personal freedom, or subject of rights, taking 
from him life and the very possibility offree action. The common good, ac­
cording to its very idea, should be the good o/this man too.71 
The penal system should instruct and correct the offender, not destroy 
him. Since correction implies the possibility of repentance and amend­
ment of life, Soloviev also rejected mandatory life imprisonment. 
In Law and Morality, Soloviev offered a biblical argument against capi­
tal punishment that is worth pausing over as a good example of his 
hermeneutics as well as of h is position on the judicial issue, Soloviev re­
garded the Bible as the book that brought humanity out of the realm of 
"savage religion and religious savagery" to a kingdom of mercy and uni­
versal reconciliatIoll. As far as capital punishment is concerned, Soloviev 
identified three crucial moments in biblical history: the punishment of 
Cain, which is reserved to God alone (Gen. 4:15); the institution of retrib­
utive justice after the Flood, an accommodation continued in the Mosaic 
Law; and a "return to the norm" in the prophets of Israel and in the gos­
peL both of which proclaim that God, and God alone, will repay sinners, 
and will repay them according to the principle, "I desire mercy, and not 
sacrifice" (Matt. 9:13 and 12:7; d. Hosea 6:6). Soloviev was convinced that 
a person who considers the biblical evidence as a whole rather than seiz­
ing on bits and pieces of text will conclude that capital punishment vio­
lates the divine norm: 
The Bible is a complex spiritual organism which developed over a thousand 
years. It is completely free ofexternal monotony and unilinearity but amazing 
in its internal unity and in the harmony of the whole. To snatch out arbitranly 
from this whole only intermedIate parts without a beginning and an end is an 
insincere and frivolous business; and to rely on the Bible In general in favor of 
the death penalty-attests either to a hopeless incomprehension or a bound­
less insolence. Those who, like Joseph de Maistre. draw together the concept 
of the death penalty with the concept of a sin offering. forget that a Sin offering 
has already been brought for all by Christ, that it has abolished all other blood 
sacrifices, and itself continues only in the bloodless Eucharist-an amazing 
lapse in consciousness on the part of persons who confess the Christian faith. 
Indeed, to permit any kind of sin offerings still-means to deny that which 
was accomplished by Christ. which means-LO betray Christianity,73 
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ECONOJ'vIlC JUSTICE 
Soloviev dealt with the issue of economic justice as he dealt with criminal 
justice: by seeking a middle way transcending one-sided approaches, in 
this case a way between capitalism and socialism. Once again Soloviev 
evinced no sympathy for unregulated market capitalism. The dislocations 
of early capitalism were everywhere to be seen in the big cities of Russia in 
the 1890S. A justification of the Good that validated plutocracy, pauperism, 
and other economic pathologies by invoking the "laws" ofeconomics wou Id 
be as great a travesty as pietistic theodicies that present cosmic and histor­
ical catastrophes as evidence of God's plan for the world. Even if capitalists 
could demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosperity of the 
many was the certain outcome of the suffering of the few. their system 
would still be wrong for the same reason that capital punishment is wrong: 
it reduces some human beings to the status of a means only. The common 
good is "the good of all and each and not of the majority 00Iy."74 
Applying this criterion to economic relalions generally, Soloviev for­
mulated the most celebrated concept in The Justification of the Good: the 
right of human beings to a "dignified" or "worthy" existence.75 Human be­
ings should live decently. An economy that makes degradation a condition 
of survival is immoral, and collective action should be taken to change it. 
"The duty of society is to recognize and to secure to each of its members 
the right to enjoy unmolested worthy human existence both for himself 
and his family."76 "To recognize and to secure": Soloviev's emphasis on se­
curing decent economic circumstances for all clearly implied the need for 
social and economic legislation. law being the arrangement that guaran­
tees a certain outcome as opposed to merely recommending it. 
Because of his interest in economic legislation, Soloviev has been called 
a "new liberal" to distinguish him from cJassica I liberals like Chicherin.77 
The term also distinguishes Soloviev from the socialists of his day. While 
there is much in his criticism of capitalism that approximates socialism, 
Soloviev never accepted the economic determinism of socialism. He re­
jected its radical egalitarianism as well. "It is one thing to strive for an im­
POSSible and unnecessary equalization of property, and another, while 
preserVing the advantages of larger property to those who have it, to rec­
ognize the right of everyone to the necessary means of worthy human ex· 
istence."78 Not equality but dignity should be the aim of economic 
legislation. Soloviev was an early advocate of what came to be called the 
democratic welfa re state.79 
Soloviev's concept of the right to a dignified existence resulted from the 
sYnthesis of his idea of law with the patristic concept of human nature as 
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capable of theosis. Soloviev invoked the concept in the chapter on eco­
nOIll ic justice in The Justification ofthe Good: 
The absolute value of man is based. as we know, upon the possibility inherent 
in his reason and his will of infinitely approaching perfection or. according 
to the patristic expression, the possibility of becomi ng d ivi ne (theosis). Th is 
possibility does not pass into actuality completely and immediately, for if it 
did man would be already equal to God-which is not the case. The inner 
potentiality becomes more and more actual. and can only do so under defi­
nite real conditions.80 
To appreciate the appeal to theosis here, one must keep two things 
in mind. First, before the revival of contemplative monasticism in 
nineteenth-century Russia and the labors of twentieth-century patristics 
scholars, the concept of theosis was in deep eclipse, even in Orthodox 
theology. Soloviev was one of the fi rst mode rn th in kers to recogn ize the 
distinctiveness and vast implications of the idea. Second. it is highly un­
usual to come across the patristic concept of theosis. or any other patris­
tic concept for that matter, in a discussion of economic justice. The 
paragraph quoted above comes from a passage where Soloviev discussed 
social statistics that show a correlation between income level and life ex­
pectancy in modern society. By interjecting the concept of theosis into 
this discussion, Soloviev drew on patristic piety to protest dehumanizing 
social conditions and so managed to connect the summum bonum of 
contemplative monks with the travails of the working class in Paris and 
Petersburg. Soloviev had the natural-born philosopher's ability to make 
connections between things that seem to most people to lie worlds apart. 
One can begin to appreciate why it was Soloviev and not someone else 
who inspired the Russian religio-philosophical renaissance of the early 
twentieth century. Soloviev showed that it was possible to overcome ex­
tremes. to reconcile opposites: Gospel and law, church and world, con­
templation and social action, Orthodoxy and humanism, God and human 
beings. Soloviev loved the Good-all of it,8\ 
Another unusual feature of Soloviev's discussion of economic issues is a 
fledgling environmentalist ethic. The right to a dignified existence involves 
the right of human beings to use nature for human ends. However, Solo­
viev did not regard this right as validating the unlimited exploitation of na­
ture, nor did he regard the relationship between human beings and nature 
as unilateral. The right relationship between human beings and nature is 
neither submission nor exploitation but "looking after [nature] for one's 
own and its lown] sake."82 The phraseology (ukhazhivanie za [prirodoi) dlia 
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sebia i dNa nee) suggests a relationship of mutuality and intimacy. Soloviev 
even extended the concept of "right" to the material world, as when he 
wrote that "matter has a right to be spi ritualized by man," suggesting a pro­
phetic vision of nature as destined for more than it has yet become. This vi­
sion underlies Soloviev's assertion that "without loving nature for its own 
sake one cannot organize material life in a moral way."S3 This was an un­
usual claim to make in a discussion of economic justice in late-nineteenth­
century Europe. Not just capitalists but even most socialists at the time 
assumed that nature existed solely to be exploited by human beings. Solo­
viev anticipated environmentalism, and more. As a recent Russian com­
mentator observed, Soloviev's vision of the spiritualization of nature is "a 
cause in comparison with which the objectives of contemporary ecology 
seem rather modest."84 Soloviev's environmentalism was inspired by the 
Pauline vision of the whole creation being destined to share in "the glori­
ous liberty of the children of God" (Rom. 8:21). 
LAW, M ORALIT Y, AN D THE CH II RCH 
Soloviev's view of the relation between law and moral it)' in The Justifica­
tion of the Good advanced beyond his position in The Critique ofAbstract 
Principles. In the Critique Soloviev emphasized the gap between law and 
morality by contrasting the formal character of law with the substantive 
va lues of moral ity. He had I itt Ie to say about how Iaw and mora lit y should 
interact concretely, even though his theocratic ideal demanded such in­
teraction. In The justification of the Good he saw a substantive relation­
ship between law and morality, defining law as the "compulsory demand 
for the realization of a definite minimum of good, or for a social order 
which excJ udes certain man ifestatio ns of evil."85 Th is den nition ru les out 
the view of law as a framework that can accommodate any end; law is now 
seen as comprising normative ends, albeit minimally conceived.B6 As we 
have seen, The Justification of the Good presented a remarkably concrete 
exposition of some of the moral ends that a legal order can promote in 
various spheres of life. 
A tension between law and morality endures in the notions of a "mini­
mum" of good and "[only] certain manifestations" of evil, restrictions 
which morality in its purest form would reject- Moral demands are unlim­
ited, never finished, and effected voluntarily. "Be perfect, therefore. as your 
heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48) is the standard.B! Legal demands, 
by COntrast, are limited, realizable, and compulsory.8oS Laws must be pre­
ciSe and doable; and they must actuaIJy effect, by force if necessary, the 
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minimal good that is their raison d'etre. If these characteristics are lack­
ing, one is dealing with something other than law, or with defective laws. 
The tension between law and morality need not lead to a divorce, how­
ever. Soloviev construed the evangelical call to perfection in such a way as 
to allow relative ethical goods including Jaw to be affirmed: 
The absolute moral principle, the demand, namely, or the commandment to 
be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect, or to realize in ourselves the im­
age and likeness of God, already contains in its very nature the recognition of 
the relative element in morality. For it is clear that the demand for perfection 
can only be addressed to a being who is imperfect; urging him to become like 
the higher being, the commandment presupposes the lower stages and the rel­
ative degrees of advance.89 
As a relative good, law pertains to imperfect beings. Yet as his words 
show, Soloviev viewed imperfection optimistically: the imperfect beings 
are advancing, heeding an upward call, participating in a process of trans­
formation extending from here to eternity. This faith helped Soloviev to 
ach ieve his nuanced appreciation of law j n The Justification of the Good, 
vindicating law as an ethical "minimurn~ without severing its connection 
to the moral and spiritual maximum. 
The church has an indispensable role to play in the "moral organization 
of humanity as a whole," as the last chapter of The Justification ofthe Good 
is entitled. The church "indicates the general direction of the goodwill of 
mankind and the final purpose of its historical activity.~ Without the 
chu reh and the ki ngdom to wh ich it bears witness, the end of Ii fe wou ld be 
opaque; history would lack a moral compass. For this reason "the state rec­
ognizes the supreme spiritual authority of the universal Church" in the 
moral ordering of life as Soloviev imagined it. However, this does not mean 
that the church may use state power to advance its mission. "The Church 
must have no power of compulsion, and the power of compulsion exercised 
by the state must have nothing to do with the domain of religion."9o The 
reason for these restrictions is that piety resembles morality rather than 
law: it is unlimited, unfinished, and voluntarily effected. And of course the 
object of piety must never be construed as a "minimum." God is unlimited, 
unfathomable, and free, and so are the demands of piety. Soloviev's long­
standing advocacy of freedom of religion in the Russian Empire also un­
derlay his position here. 
Whether Soloviev ever envisioned the formal separation of church and 
state is debatable. Most interpreters have emphasized the contrast be­
tween his earlier works and The Justification of the Good, construing the 
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former as vehicles of theocratic utopianism, the latter as evidence of the 
"dissolution of theocratic views."91 Yet the status of theocracy in Soloviev's 
later works has not been adequately clarified. The issue is what Soloviev 
meant in practical terms when he wrote that "the state recognizes the su­
preme spirltua I authority of the universal Church." Walicki claims that. 
for the later Soloviev, "free theocracy was, so to speak. stripped of its mil­
lenarian features and reduced to something like a Kantian 'regulative idea' 
in ethics:")?' But this seems to understate the case in order to make 5010­
viev more acceptable to a secularist audience. In the closing pages of The 
Justification of the Good Soloviev still wrote of a "Ch ristian state" whose 
"progressive task" is "to prepare humanity and the whole earth for the 
Kingdom of God."93 He still entrusted the moral organization of human­
ity to the "harmonious cooperation" of prophet. priest, and king.94 Is this 
language merely ornamentation for a proto-secular ideal? In a perverse 
way Boris Chicherin may have been closer to the truth when he criticized 
the author of The Justification of the Good for taking positions "which 
Torquemada could adopt."95 It was an unfair comparison, of course, and 
would have been unfair even if Chicherin were discussing Soloviev's ear­
lier works. Soloviev never preached clericalism, far less the Inquisition, 
but always a "free" theocracy. Still, Chicherin saw something that Solo­
viev's cultured admirers tend to minimize or to miss: for all its modern­
ism and moderation, The Justification of the Good remains the work of a 
mystic, a prophet, and a Christia n theocrat.96 
An arresting example of the impact of Soloviev's strong Christian faith 
on his view of the legal order is found in his observations on Plato's Laws 
in a late essay.97 The case is all the more poignant because of the similarity 
between Plato's Laws and Soloviev's lustification ofthe Good. Both are es­
says of applied ethics in which an aging philosopher attempts "to recon­
cile [his) ideal with practicality, combining minimalism in the former 
sphere with rnaximalism in the latter."9s Soloviev gave a sobering account 
of the path that led the Plato of the Laws, like so many thinkers after him, 
to absolutize the legal and political order. Smitten as a young man by the 
goodness, truth, and beauty revealed in Socrates, Plato became increas­
ingly frustrated by his inability to realize these va lues in the world of flesh 
and blood, leading him first, in the Republic, to accommodate such dubi­
ous means of social order as slavery, war, and tyranny, and finally, in the 
Laws, to advocate the death penalty for "any man who rejects or upsets the 
authority of the ancestral laws, both relative to the gods and relative to the 
public order.... Thus the greatest disciple of Socrates, who had been 
called to independent ph iIosoph iea I creat ivit y by hi sind ignation at t he le­
gal murder of his teacher, toward the end totally rests on the point of view 
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of An)'tos and Melitos, who had obtained the death sentence for Socrates 
precisely because of his liberal attitude to the established religious-civil 
order." Why did this happen? It happened, Soloviev believed, because 
Plato attempted "the reform of societal relations" without believing in "the 
regeneration of human natu re"; and he did not bel ieve in the regenerat ion 
of human nature because he did not know "the One who has the power of 
resurrection to eternal life." Plato knew Socrates, but not Christ. the "au­
thentic, substantive God-Man,~ The Russian Plato would not make the 
same mistake, As an Orthodox Christian, be knew the Resurrected 
One,99 
SOLOYIEY'S LEGACY 
In the conclusion to his monograph on Soloviev's philosophy of law, Hans 
Helmut Gantze! offers a generalization that few would dispute: that "the de­
fining characteristic of the whole of Soloviev's philosophy is the unity of 
faith, science and life." \Xlhat this means for jurisprudence is "the ultimate 
graund ing of law in moraJit y and, through morality, in the Ch ristian idea of 
salvation,"loo Soloviev did not construe these connections in such a way as 
to deny the important analytical and methodological distinctions separat­
ing law, morality, and Christian faith; but he rejected all Viewpoints, secular 
or religious, that would absolutize those distinctions. Reality for Soloviev 
was an ever·f1ow ing stream issu ing in the eschatological ki ngdom of God, 
TIle impact of Soloviev's theo-philosophical vision on Russian intellec­
tual culture in the next generation, usually called the Silver Age (1900-17), 
was enormous, Within two years of his death, Russian neoidealism issued 
its mallifesto,'O\ The young ex-Marxists Sergei Bulgakov and Nicholas 
Berdyaev began recreating themselves as rei igious philosophers, soon to be 
joined by others, The most important work of collective self-criticism in the 
history of the Russian intelligentsia, Vekhi (1909), struck Solovievia n chords 
in essay after essay.102 Even anti-Solovievian thinkers, such as Lev Shestov, 
could not escape his influence. Nor was Soloviev's impact limited to philos­
ophers. The Vladimir Soloviev Religious-Philosophical Society that existed 
in Moscow from 1905 to 1918 numbered prominent cultural figures from 
many fields among its members or participants, induding the poets Alek­
sandr Blok and Andrei Belyi, the literary critic Viacheslav Ivanov, the painter 
Mikhail Nesterov, and the composer Aleksandr Scriabin,lo3 No Russian 
philosopher had ever attracted such wide attention. 
Of course it was possible to take an interest in Soloviev without paying 
attention to his philosophy of law. It was easier to appreciate Soloviev's lit­
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erary criticism, political commentary, and Sophia poems than to plough 
through the 550 pages of The Justification of the Good. Writing in a com­
memorative volume six months after Soloviev's death, Pavel Novgorodt­
sev made an observation that applies to Soloviev's readership at all times 
including our own: ('The person who knows Soloviev mainly in terms of 
his mystical speculations and yearnings will surely be surprised to learn 
that he was a brilliant and outstanding spokesman for the philosophy of 
law. It is difficult to see at first just how something as concrete and practi­
cal as the idea of law found a place among his reveries and prophecies."101 
There were important exceptions, however, including Novgorodtsev 
himself, who was already emerging as one of Russia's leading philosophers 
of law. Moreover, apart from Soloviev, a new legal consciousness was 
emerging in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. The inaugu­
ration of a quasi-constitutional order in 1905-6 strengthened this develop­
ment, as did the formation of the Constitutional Democratic Party 
("Kadets"), which directly or indirectly enjoyed the allegiance of many of 
Russia's neoidealists and religious philosophers. A little-known fact about 
Russia's early twentieth-century religious thinkers is that many of them 
had received academic training in law. Sergei Bulgakov, Evgeny Trubetskoi, 
Lev Shestov, Ivan Ilyin, and Boris Vysheslavtsev were all graduates of law 
faculties, while others had studied law at some point in their education. 
Several of the religious philosophers worked professionally in law and con­
tributed monographs in the field. Even when they chose other paths, how­
ever, evidence of a well-formed legal consciousness can usually be found in 
thei r work. Most early twentieth -centu ry Russian religious phi losophers 
were comfortable with the view of Orthodoxy as part of a modern legal­
constitutional order, a view pioneered by SoloYiev. 
Among professional church theologians the attitude toward Soloviev ran 
the gamut from traditionalist censure to deep admiration. Interestingly, the 
first monograph on Soloviev's philosophy came not from the pen of one of 
his heirs in the intelligentsia but from a teacher in a provincial Orthodox 
theological seminary, Aleksandr Nikolsky (1866-1915). Nikolsky, whose 
graduate degree was from the Moscow -n1eological Academy, exemplified 
the high level of philosophical and theological culture that had been 
achieved in the Russian Orthodox Church by the beginning of the twenti­
eth century. The title of his book, The Russian Origen ofthe Nineteenth Cen­
tury, VI. S. Soloviev, presents Soloviev as a mixed blessing for the church, 
mUch like the Alexandrian genius of the third century. Soloviev in this ac­
COunt was admirable in his sincere Christian faith and determination to 
grapple with the eternal questions of human existence in the light of the 
gospel, but deserved criticism for "approaching the examination and 
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investigation of the Divine mysteries with less humility and less faith in 
Scripture than one might have expected from a believing Christian, and 
with greater confidence in the power of abstract reason than one should al­
low on the basis of the strictly logica I demands of phiJosophy."\OS 
Unfortunately, this balanced view of Soloviev is not as widely held in 
the Orthodox world today as it was in Nikolsky's time. Following a brief 
renaissance of Solovievian theology during the 1920S and 1930S, thanks to 
the inlluence of Sergei Bulgakov, church theologians began to lose interest 
in hi m. The neopatristic school of Georges Florovsky and Vladimir LOS5ky, 
which has dominated Orthodox theology since the 1940S, judges Soloviev 
harshly, as do contemporary neotraditionalist theologians. One of the by­
products of the marginalization of the Solovievian legacy is the absence of 
work on philosophy of Jaw by Orthodox theologians. 
In Russian intellectual culture generally, on the other hand, interest in 
Soloviev remains significant. During the Soviet period, of course, Soloviev 
was a nonperson, neither published nor publicly discussed. Of course, 
philosophy of law as an independent discipline was not practiced, either. 
With the recovery of the Solovievian corpus during the glasnost reforms 
of the 1980s, Soloviev assumed a place of distinction in what is sometimes 
called the "Russian rei igio-moral ph ilosophy of law."106 The claim implicit 
in this phrase was advanced long ago by Pavel Novgorodtsev in an essay in 
which he argued that modern Russian philosophy of law inclines to "the 
establishment of a [close] bond bet ween taw and morality" and "the sub­
ordination of culture and the state to religion and ChUfCh.n107 The fact 
that Novgorodtsev's characterization continues to have some currency in 
Russian legal philosophy today is evidence of the continuing influence of 
Soloviev, from whom he derived it. The prominent place assigned to an ar­
ticle on Soloviev's philosophy of Jaw at the head of a distinguished new 
collection of essays on Soloviev by Russian and non-Russian scholars is 
further evidence of the growing respect accorded to an aspect of the "Rus­
sian Origen's" thought which has too oflen been neglected. lOS As the Rus­
sian and worldwide Orthodox community seeks to contribute to the 
building of a stable constitutional order in the postcommunist East, Solo­
viev's legacy on Jaw and human nature in the light of Christian faith can 
only grow in importance. 
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